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NUTRITION AND HYDRATION: 
MORALCON~DERATIONS 
A Statement of The Catholic Bishops of Pennsylvania 
Foreword 
It is well known that there has been a great deal of discussion at every 
level in our Church and in society at large concerning "advance medical 
directives." These issues are already having a profound effect on the way in 
which we live. They inj7uence not only our loved ones who are dying. but 
the very manner in which we view human life in general. Since all of us are 
mortal. these are issues which will also have an immense impact on each of 
us personally. 
Because of this. the Catholic Bishops of Pennsy lvania have collaborated 
in the composItion of the following statement which is an effort on our part 
to fulfill our responsibilities as bishops to give guidance to all the Catholic 
faithful of this state who are entrusted to our care. It is also our hope that 
these observations and the principles on which they are based will be of help 
to all who recognize the importance of deliberating at length on the moral 
aspects of the difficult question of providingfood andj7uids to patients. Our 
statement is intended to express. as well as we are currently able. the 
teaching of the Catholic Church as it affects these admittedly difficult cases. 
As we here profess our faith that all human life is sacred since it comes 
from God. we pray that all who read our statement willjoin us in our resolve 
truly to care for those in need among us. 
The Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe 
December 12. 1991 
Introduction 
Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua 
Archbishop of Philadelphia 
Recent court decisions and the enactment of federal and state laws 
governing advance medical directives (living will or durable power of 
attorney) have given many the impression that anything the courts of the 
civil laws allow is morally acceptable. The issue of the withholding or 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in particular has become 
controverted. We, as Catholic Bishops and fellow Pennsylvanians, hope 
that what follows will be of help to many of those who are confused about 
the present situation, but we especially seek to offer guidance to the 
Catholic faithful entrusted to our pastoral care. 
God's plan for humanity is not the blindness of a predetermined fate, but 
a plan oflove involving all human beings, not as objects but as participants. 
The call to respond to the moral law is not a call to legalistic obedience; it is 
the call to live those actions and intentions which enable us to share eternal 
happiness. "The highest norm of human life is the divine la w itself - eternal, 
objective, and universal - by which God orders, directs, and governs the 
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whole world and the ways of the human community, according to a plan 
conceived in his wisdom and love. God has enabled man to participate in 
this law of his so that, under the gentle disposition of divine Providence, 
many may be able to arrive at a deeper and deeper knowledge of the 
unchangeable truth."l 
The teaching authority of the Church is not an exercise in legal power. 
Rather, it is given to the Church so that she can exercise her sacred 
obligation to penetrate and proclaim the truth, to know the reality of God's 
plan for our salvation and to set us free to discover and enjoy that which in 
the end will make us most happy. The attainment of that end involves faith, 
but it is not a totally blind faith nor is this moral law simply a series of flat 
commands. God calls us as we are - as his children capable of responding 
to him in love and with ever deepening understanding. The function of the 
Church, therefore, is not simply to command but also to persuade, and to 
do so out of a love and concern which mirrors the love and concern of God 
himself. 
The sources of moral teaching are divine revelation and the use of our 
God-given ability to reason and to come to the truth. Reason and faith are 
intimately related and that relat ionship is evident in the topic that we now 
address. Medical practice deals with the most basic issues of life and death, 
issues that concern the health, w~lfare and even the salvation of humanity. 
The vocation to care for the life and health of others is to call to serve the 
most basic good of every person - life itself. True concern for ·health 
involves not only the welfare of the body, but the deepest welfare· of the 
whole person. It should come as no surprise that the very best medical care 
and the application of the highest moral principles will inevitably coincide 
and can never be in conflict with each other. 
Life and death decisions are a matter of concern not only to those 
immediately affected by them but to everyone of us as well. As Catholic 
Bishops it is our responsibility to present the teaching of the Church in 
moral matters, since we are charged with the duty of providing pastoral 
guidance for the faithful who must live the Christian message in 
contemporary society. 
In 1980, the Magisterium addressed the general question of euthanasia in 
the decree of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Jura et Bona. 
That degree enunciates certain important principles applicable to the 
present discussion, but it does not address the specific issue of the 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. On one hand, we are clearly obliged 
as Catholics to adhere to the guidance of the Magisterium. On the other 
hand, the present complex issue has not yet been explicitly dealt with by 
the Holy See. That simple fact, however, does not mean that the faithful are 
free to act as though there were no guidelines at all. This is all the more 
reason why the present intervention on our part has been thought 
necessary. 
The purpose of our statement is multiple. (I) We wish to offer guidance to 
Catholics involved in decision making, especially pastors of souls, those 
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in the health-care profession and its beneficiaries. (2) We wish to offer our 
teaching as a way of engaging in a dialogue of public policy as it affects all 
those involved with legislative and judicial decisions. (3) We wish to present 
the developed tradition of a medical ethic which for centuries has guided 
doctors and patients alike to achieve the highest standards of health care and 
moral good. As Bishops we speak as official teachers and spokesmen for the 
Church, but we speak also as citizens concerned with the welfare of all in our 
society. 
This issue is basic - the care for and preservation of life itself. Modern 
medicine offers us modes of care and cure once undreamed of, but such 
advances also raise serious questions demanding essential decisions. Many 
question whether they must initiate or continue various medical treatments. 
They wonder if and when it is allowable to stop even the basics of life, such as 
food and water. Court decisions and proposed legislation on living wills 
make these issues timely, even though they cannot be resolved on legal 
grounds alone, since they have an inescapable moral significance as well. 
Bioethics based on philosophy and legal principles provide some guidance 
through the maze of problems in health care. 2 Yet it is also clear that 
philosophy and law alone do not adequately address all of the real concerns 
and pertinent issues. Religious bioethics makes an invaluable contribution to 
contemporary moral debates by offering insights into human nature, the 
purpose of life, the meaning of suffering and education to true virtue. These 
considerations assist doctors and patients alike to make wise choices both in 
everyday practice and in the most difficult of cases. Religiously grounded 
bioethics leads people to place their attention on the right thing to do and 
frees the autonomy of choice from a vision which can easily become narrow 
and even dreadfully wrong. We can humanize the face of technology by 
giving it a moral evaluation in reference to the dignity of the human person, 
who is called to realize the God-given vocation to life and love.3 
State of the Question 
Modern medicine continues to deal with age-old questions, even though 
current knowledge and technologies offer treatments and procedures that 
would once have been impossible. One such area is the supplying of nutrition 
and hydration to patients who are incapable of feeding themselves and are 
unable to take nourishment orally even with assistance. It is now possible to 
sustain the lives of such patients with a variety of techniques, and so arises the 
question of the moral obligation to do so. This question of moral obligation 
touches not only the patient, who has primary responsibility for the 
reasonable care of health and life, but also those who have responsibility for 
the patient who is no longer able to exercise self-determination. 
The possibilities of sustaining life for extended periods of time raise other 
questions. Is it possible not only to keep a patient alive, but even to sustain 
apparent vital signs in patients who are in fact dead? There is ordinarily a 
moral obligation to do what can reasonably be done to sustain life. There is 
no similar obligation to sustain apparent vital signs in a patient who is 
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already dead. In the past these questions would not have arisen. The patient 
who was incapable of taking nourishment , especially the unconscious patient, 
would have died. At present, however, we have a whole array of methods by 
which life support can be supplied even for those who are unconscious. 
Decision making is further complicated by questions in regard to 
determination of death with a view to using organs as material for 
transplants into other patients. There are questions about the continued 
cost of long sustained unconscious life in view of the use of time, effort and 
resources that could otherwise be ·directed to care or treatment for other 
types of patients. There are questions also about the condition of 
unconscious patients (in terms of pain and suffering) and about the grief 
and suffering of family members who witness the process and who may 
participate in their care - sometimes for months or even years. 
Determination of Death 
Even though theology may describe death as the separation of body and 
soul,4 this separation is not itself visible and directly verifiable. The Church 
has always had to rely on the use of medical signs or symptoms to determine 
just when death has occurred. Until recently these signs were simple 
enough: cessation of heart beat, cessation of respiration, fixed and dilated 
pupils, no sign of conscious response to external stimuli. We now 
sometimes find the need for other signs as well. Patients who exhibit .all of 
the classical signs but who have also experienced severe hypothermia 
(lowering of body temperature) have been resuscitated even after periods of 
time that would once have been fatal. Other patients who would have 
exhibitM all of the classical signs do not do so, because they have been 
attached to respirators or heart-lung machines which supply oxygen and so 
sustain the vital signs for some time even after true death may have 
occurred. This has led to the medical need for other signs in addition to 
those previously universally used. The development of additional criteria is 
perfectly understandable even from a theological point of view, since it is 
still the effort to determine the definitive moment of separation of body and 
soul by means of signs and symptoms. 
Advances in diagnosis and in the determination of death have also led to 
a more exacting distinction between death and various types of 
unconsciousness. 5 In the effort to find clear indications of death, inedicine 
has developed criteria for brain death. These criteria have developed 
especially from the need to determine, as closely as possible, the moment of 
death in organ donors so that the organs may be used as soon as possible 
before serious decomposition begins. 
In most cases the classical criteria are sufficient to determine the fact that 
death has occurred. Some patients, however, may be alive but do not show 
signs of life (e.g., victims of hypothermia or those under the influence of 
barbiturates or anesthetizing or paralyzing drugs). Others may be dead and 
yet show what appear to be vital signs (e.g., patients who are attached 
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to life support equipment). In the former, life support equipment may be 
required until their condition can be determined. In the latter, the necessity 
for any treatment or life support has ceased. In either case there mus.t be an 
honest effort to determine whether the patient is dead or alive . This is the 
purpose behind the move to the brain death criteria. 
The norms generally adopted in medical care and in the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act6 (which, in variously modified forms, has been 
legislated in many states) are variations of the "Harvard criteria."7 
Moralists have generally accepted these criteria as valid for our present state 
of knowledge of the nervous system, although newer information may lead 
to revision, just as new information led to the need for modification of 
earlier criteria. 8 
. If the fact of death can be thus determined, then there is no moral 
obligation to continue medical treatment or care of any kind , since the 
person is dead. However, what concerns us here is the treatment that must 
be given to those who are not dead but who, for whatever reason, cannot 
supply their own nourishment. 
States of Unconsciousness9 
All states of unconsciousness are often referred to (even by medical 
personnel) as "coma." This is, in fact, not a correct designation. 10 Coma is 
but one type of impaired consciouness. There are also others which we 
should consider because all of them present situtions in which problems 
may arise in terms of the supplying of nutrition and hydration. 
A true coma is a state of "unarousable unresponsiveness" with no 
response to external stimuli. The person is not dead, but is in a state of sleep. 
This condition is never permanent. I I It may last as long as six months, but it 
will resolve itself into some other state. The person may emerge into 
consciousness again or sink into another state, such as that which is referred 
to as the persistent vegetative state. It may take some time, even months, to 
diagnose the exact condition. 
The persistent vegetative state (PVS) is deeper than a coma. The coma is 
a state of sleep; PVS is a form of deep unconsciousness. The cerebrum, the 
upper part of the brain, gives evidence of impaired or failed operation 
- and it is this portion of the brain, in its cortex or outer layer, which is 
responsible for those activities that we recognize as specifically human. 12 
Another portion of the brain, the brainstem, is, however, still functioning in 
the PVS patient. It is this portion of the brain which controls involuntary 
functions such as breathing, blinking, involuntary contractions, and cycles 
of waking and sleep. Thus PVS patients may open their eyes and sometimes 
follow movement with them or respond to loud and sudden noises 
(although these responses will be neither long sustained nor apparently 
purposeful). There will be cyclical stages of sleeping and waking, but such 
activity is a function of the brainstem and is not an indicator of purposeful 
human activity. 13 
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PVS is sometimes referred to as "cerebral death." This is an unfortunate 
terminology, since it seems to imply that there is "brain death" as described 
earlier. This is not true. There is a failure offunction at one level in the brain, 
but not all, and the person in PVS is definitely not dead. Even medical 
personnel sometimes refer to such a patient as "brain dead." This is simply 
not the case. 14 
There is also a state which is referred to as psychiatric pseudocoma. This 
is a state of unconsciousness caused by shock or trauma which leads the 
victim to close off from the outside world. This may be so severe as to give 
the appearance of death, but it is not even truly a state of unconsciousness . 
It is simply total lack of response. 
Finally, there is another condition which is referred to as the locked-in 
state. This condition is caused by an interruption in the descending motor 
pathways of the nervous system. "In this condition, paralysis, not cognitive 
failure, leads to a lack of ability to communicate."15 The patient is fully 
conscious, but simply has no way in which to indicate conscious response. 
(In some cases, however, depending on where the motor pathways are 
interrupted, communication may be possible by such means as coded eye 
blinking.) It takes careful diagnosis not to mistake this patient for the PVS 
patient. PET scans can distinguish between the locked-in state and the 
persistent vegetative state. The EEG, however, cannot do so, since the 
patient in the locked-in state may show an abnormal response, while the 
PVS patient may produce readings that are near-normal. 16 Patients who 
have recovered from this condition reveal that they were indeed conscious 
and well aware of what was going on around them - and had a strong 
desire to continue to live. 
In none of these classes of unconscious patients are we dealing with the 
dead. All of them are alive and some of them may well be expected to 
recover. The one case in which recovery becomes most unlikely is that of the 
PVS patient, and it is this patient who is likely'to become the object of 
decision making in regard to continued treatment or care, or supplying of 
nourishment. 
Ordinary and Extraordinary Means of Care17 
The Catholic moral tradition holds that one is morally obliged to use the 
ordinary means of sustaining life, but is not obliged to make use of 
extraordinary means . IS Ordinary means are those which are available and 
do not require effort, suffering or expense beyond that which most people 
would consider appropriate in a serious situation. This would include most 
of the developed procedures and techniques commonly practiced in 
medicine and surgery. However, moralists recognize that there are also 
subjective elements which influence our ability to make moral judgments. 
Subjective considerations of pain, expense and personal abhorrence may 
act as obstacles to the fulfillment of this obligation. Furthermore, not all 
techniques have to be used in every instance. What would usually be 
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ordinary means may, in certain cases, offer little hope of success and may 
prove more burdensome than beneficial to the user. In such situations one 
would not be morally obliged to use such means. 19 
The distinction between ordinary means (which we are morally obliged 
to use) and extraordinary means (which we may choose to use, but are not 
obliged to) is not based solely on the commonness and availability of the 
means themselves, although this is taken into account. It is also based on the 
results that one can expect and on certain serious subjective considerations 
and attitudes as well. It takes into account the proportion between benefit 
and burden. 
Principles of Decision Making 
Decisions on the use of appropriate means for the preservation of life and 
health can sometimes be complex. One way in which to approach them is to 
ask questions which can illuminate the process and direct the questioner to 
the best sources for the answers. Those sources involve moral teaching, 
medical information and the concrete condition and means of the patient 
and the patient's family . What is being suggested here applies as a help to 
the decision making process for all patients, including both the conscious 
and the unconscious. Obviously, however, the process for the unconscious 
patient will involve the use of some sort of "substituted judgment."2o 
Is the procedure beneficial to the patient in terms of preservation oflife or 
restoration of health? Is it serving a life-saving purpose? Is it adding a 
serious burden? Is death already imminent, so that the proposed treatment 
may add briefly to the life span in such a way as simply to prolong the dying 
process without actually preserving life? Questions such as these must be 
directed to experts in the field of medicine, although in difficult cases even 
the experts may presently be unable to give final answers to all questions. 
Is the procedure a grave burden to the patient, and has that burden 
become unbearable or intolerable? No one can actually answer that 
question except the patient or, perhaps, the patient's family. At the same 
time, suffering is a part of every life and has a spiritual and salutary 
significance. Judgments in this area must be tempered by the presence ofthe 
varying degrees of depression that any suffering patient or family may be 
experience. They may need help in overcoming the temptation simply to 
give up. At this point the pastoral counselor may be of considerable 
assistance. We must still recognize, however, the subjective aspect of 
"unbearableness" and must respect moral judgments made in good 
conscience. 
If the patient is not competent, then who is to make this sort of judgment? 
What motives will enter into that decision? Here again the pastoral 
counselor can be of considerable help and so too is the intimate knowledge 
that family members might be excepted to have of the patient. 
We must also realize that moralists and medical personnel may not 
always be using exactly the same definitions of ordinary and extraordinary 
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means. Medical personnel often use the terms to refer to the means of 
treatment in themselves, considering them ordinary unless they are 
experimental or rarely used. The moralist must also take into account those 
other elements mentioned earlier, that is, the burdens and benefits the 
particular treatment may have for the patient or for others.21 Thus the 
moral terminology is usually more related to the condition of the patient,22 
while the medical terminology is more related to the technique itself. The 
moral judgment is based on the benefit of the technique for the patient as 
compared to the accompanying burden, and not simply on the availability 
of the technique. Clarity on this point can help to remove one source of 
confusion. 
Decision makers should also be aware that the decision to terminate a 
treatment is usually not morally different from the decision not to initiate 
that treatment in the first place. The same moral norms apply in each 
instance, but there are circumstantial differences. When treatment is 
initiated, the prognosis may not yet be clear. No one is able to predict the 
future course of events. The more definitive the prognosis, the more easily 
the moral norms can be applied in a concrete manner. However, it may take 
considerable time to determine that a patient has entered into a persistent 
vegetative state. The duration of unconsciousness itself is an important 
determinant in both diagnosis and prognosis. Maximum treatment is 
required in the earliest stages, while full or partial recovery still remains a 
greater possibility. Even the location or extent of brain or brainstem 
damage may not be an accurate indicator in every instance. Time and 
treatment are both required. In general, the younger the patient, the more 
likely is recovery. After three months the chance of recovery always lessens. 
Recovery after six months of the vegetative state is probably less than I in 
100, and after twelve months almost never. 23 
It is most often when the treatments have run their course and the patient 
is clearly not going to recover that the decisions must be made. Prognosis 
and the condition of the patient may be clearer than they were at first. Even 
then, there is still a serious obstacle to easy decision making. No matter how 
clear the case may be by the time a decision is made, the decision to 
withdraw a treatment or some form of care already in progress is 
psychologically more difficult, since it is always hard for the survivors not to 
feel that its withdrawal was the cause of death. 
Provision of Nutrition and Hydration 
Feeding Methods 
There are various ways to supply nourishment to the unconscious. The 
general categories would include at least these three: Oral feeding, enteral 
feeding and parenteral feeding. 
Ora/feeding simply means that food (which may be pureed) or drink can 
be placed in the mouth and the patient will then swallow it. For some 
patients, even in the persistent vegetative state, this may be enough, 
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provided that the swallowing reflex is sufficiently unimpaired . At times, 
however, the medical staff will prefer not to use this method, even in cases 
where it could be used, since it can be quite time consuming for a staff that 
may already have a large number of patients to care for. 24 
Enteral (within the bowel)feeding means that the nourishment is placed 
directly into the upper end of the small intestine. This can be accomplished 
by means of a nasogastric (through the nose and into the stomach) or 
nasoduodenal (through the nose and into the upper end ofthe small bowel) 
tube, or it can also be done through a gastrostomy (an opening directly into 
the stomach) or jejunostomy (an opening into the upper part of the small 
bowel). This method does not usually result in complications and, even if 
some complications do arise, they are usually not of a serious nature,25 but 
the method does presuppose that the gastro-intestinal tract is intact and 
functioning. 
Parenteral (outside the bowel) feeding refers to the supplying of 
nourishment intravenously. This may be done when the gastro-intestinal 
tract is not intact or does not function. It may be accomplished for a short 
time by means of tubes inserted into the peripheral veins (e.g. , in the arms or 
legs), but this can easily lead to thrombosis (clotting). Therefore, if it is to be 
used for longer periods, it is done by inserting a tube into the central venous 
system,26 There is need for daily monitoring of nutrients, waste products 
and blood chemistry until the patient becomes stable, after which 
monitoring can be less frequent . This method of nutrition also carries with 
it greater risks of complications. Metabolic complications may arise, 
resulting in bone disease, liver dysfunction or other problems. There may 
also be nonmetabolic complications, such as thrombosis or the 
introduction of infecting organisms. However, the relative simplicity ofthis 
method is evidenced by the fact that in some situations it has been used as a 
form of home care allowing some types of conscious patients to resume 
many of their normal activities. 
Decisions in Relation to Nutrition and Hydration 
There are instances in which it is relatively easy to apply moral principles 
to the decision to withhold or withdraw nutrition. In the case of a terminal 
cancer patient whose death is imminent , for instance, the decision to begin 
intravenous feeding or feeding by nasogastric tube or gastrostomy, may 
also mean that the patient is going to endure greater suffering for a 
somewhat longer period of time - without hope of recovery or even 
appreciable lengthening of life. Weighing the balance of benefits versus 
burdens makes it relatively easy to decide that this could fall into the 
category of extraordinary means and that such feeding procedures need not 
be initiated or may be discontinued. 
We are faced with a different set of questions when we begin to examine 
the case of the long-term patient who must be fed by some of the means 
described above (i.e., those more complicated than assisted oral feeding). 
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The question of patients in the persistent vegetative state is particularly 
important. There is no question here of "brain death," even though that 
term is so frequently misused in the media (who cannot always be expected 
to know better) and by medical practitioners (who certainly ought to know 
better). The PVS patient is alive, but unconscious and , therefore, unable to 
take nourishment without assistance. It is clearly not a question of deciding 
to stop treatment because the patient has died . 
Questions relative to the supplying of nutrition and hydration are often 
qualified by the term "artificial." The discussion thus tends to center on 
whether artificial nutrition and hydration are to be continued or not in 
certain cases. It is not, howev'er, the question of whether a type of care is 
artificial or natural that makes the difference in terms of its continuance or 
discontinuance. The fact is that every mode of taking in food and drink is, to 
some extent, artificial. This is the case whether we speak of the patient 
receiving parenteral feeding or the honored guest at a banquet for royalty 
- a banquet which observes every nicety of the most sophisticated table 
manners and requires a certain expertise in the recognition of all 
appropriate cutlery. Both situations provide nourishment and both also use 
some artificial means to supply it. The real question, when it comes to 
decision making for the unconscious patient, depends in the final analysis 
on something other than a distinction between artificial and natural means. 
If the supplying·of nutrition and hydration is of benefit to the patient and 
causes no undue burden of pain or suffering or excessive expenditure of 
resources, then it is our duty to take and to provide that nutrition and 
hydration. If the burdens ' have far surpassed the benefits, then our 
obligation has ceased. 
A distinction is also often made between treatment and care. In the case 
of the patient in the persistent vegetative state, some would hold that we are 
obliged to continue to supply the proper care, but are not obliged to 
continue treatment. 27 The reason for this statement is that treatment in this 
instance is no longer useful in resolving the unconscious state of the patient. 
For many, then, it becomes a question of whether feeding constitutes 
treatment or care. If the former, then it may be discontinued. If the latter, it 
must continue. Statements by the Pontifical Council on Health Affairs and 
the Pontifical Academy of Sciences both hold to this distinction and say 
that treatment may be discontinued, but they then go on to explain that they 
view the supplying of nutrition and hydration as care - which must, 
therefore, be continued (presupposing, of course, the distinctions already 
made in reference to the question of excessive burdens).28 
There is, however, another way to look at this. In the case of the 
imminently terminal patient one would suppose that treatment is intended 
to reverse the course ofthe disease or, at least, to better the condition of the 
patient. If it no longer does that, then its discontinuance is no more than a 
clear recognition of its futility . Even feeding methods other than oral thus 
become futile and can be stopped so as to attend more to the comfort of the 
one who is dying. In certain clearly defined cases, then, even certain types 
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of care might become extraordinary if they were futile or excessively 
burdensome. 
However, the patient in the persistent vegetative state is not imminently 
terminal (provided that there is no other pathology present). The feeding 
- regardless of whether it be considered as treatment or as care - is serving 
a life-sustaining purpose. Therefore, it remains an ordinary means of 
sustaining life and should be continued. In other words, the mere 
distinction between treatment and care does not of itself resolve the moral 
problem. Rather, its resolution still remains within the scope of the usual 
norms of ordinary and extraordinary means. Whether it is viewed as 
treatment or care, it would be morally wrong to discontinue nutrition and 
hydration when they are within the realm of ordinary means. 
What obligations, then, do exist? The moral obligation to preserve life 
and .health falls immediately on the one whose health it is. Is one morally 
obliged to submit to procedures to supply nutrition and hydration? Or are 
they in the category of extraordinary care, and therefore not obligatory? Of 
course, in the case of the PVS patient, these decisions will be made by 
others, since the patient is incapable of making them. Obviously, the 
primary focus should be on the patient. With this in mind, then, we can 
begin to find our moral response by answering the questions proposed 
earlier, when we discussed the process of decision making. 
Questions Related to the Medical Condition of the Patient 
Is the procedure (supplying of nutrition and hydration) beneficial to the 
patient in terms of preservation of life or restoration of health? Supplying 
nourishment sustains life; it does not of itself restore health to a former 
state. However, it is clearly beneficial in terms of preservation of life, since 
death would be inevitable without it and life will continue with it. 
Is it serving a life-saving purpose? There is no doubt about the fact that it 
is, since the patient could not survive without it and is unable to supply it for 
himself. 
Is it adding a serious burden? In almost every case the answer is negative. 
The means of supplying food in themselves are all relatively simple and -
barring complications - generally without pain. 
Is death already imminent so that the proposed procedures (supplying of 
nourishment, in this case) may add briefly to the life span in such a way as 
simply to prolong the dying process without actually preserving life? The 
pathological condition which has caused the persistent vegetative state or 
which is concurrent with it may threaten imminent death. Or it may be such 
as simply to make it impossible for the patient to care for himself. In this 
latter case the condition would not in itself be immediately life-threatening, 
but the lack of nourishment would be. Supplying nourishment would not 
be an instance of simply prolonging the dying process without actually 
preserving life. Life would be preserved at length and not merely 
temporarily prolonged while waiting for an imminently terminal condition 
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to complete its course. 
Questions Related to the Internal Disposition of the Patient 
Is the procedure a grave burden to the patient, and has that burden 
become unbearable or intolerable? In terms of the gravity of any burden, it is 
always the one who bears the burden who is in the best position to answer 
this sort of question. In the present case, however, we are dealing precisely 
with a patient who is incapable of giving any answer. So far as can be 
determined by observation, the unconscious patient is not experiencing the 
anguish that would be borne by a conscious person in' these or similar 
circumstances. The parts of the brain responsible for the specifically human 
qualities of anticipation and anguish that so affect human pain are precisely 
those parts which are not now functioning. As to the intensity of any 
physical pain due to the increased atrophy of muscle, the discomfort of 
immobility, the feelings arising from various medical procedures, etc., there 
would seem to be no way at the present time to render final and definitive 
judgment, although the external signs in the unconscious patient do not 
indicate excessive discomfort which cannot be relieved by those who have 
charge of the patient's care. 
The question as to whether the patient in the persistent vegetative state 
feels pain is not an easy one to address, since the patient is the very one who 
is incapable of answering any question about the situation. Some of the 
problem, of course, is based on the way in which we view pain. There is a 
distinction between pain as a physical sensation and pain as the affective 
response associated with human suffering. 29 The response of the vegetative 
patient to noxious stimuli would indicate that there is a physical response to 
pain or discomfort. However, physical evidence also indicates that the 
affective level of human suffering is not present. Experience with such 
patients shows no behavioral indication of such suffering. Postmortem 
examinations usually reveal a degree of damage to the cerebral hemispheres 
sufficient to preclude the experience of suffering. PET scanning also shows 
a metabolic rate in the cortex so reduced as to be incompatible with 
consciousness. 
We can say, therefore, that all appearances would generally seem to 
indicate that there is no excessive pain involved in the feeding process. The 
feeding procedures themselves, except where there may be some serious 
complications, may involve some discomfort, but nothing excessive (this 
can be determined from the reactions of conscious patients who for one 
reason or another, have undergone such procedures). Feeding methods do 
not generally carry with them the sometimes serious discomfort which 
would be found in the patient on a respirator. 
As to the discomfort of being in this condition for years, unable to 
communicate and unable to help oneself, it is not possible to make a final 
and decisive comment. If, indeed, the patient is unconscious then there is no 
awareness of these inabilities and, consequently, none of the anguish that 
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would attend them. However, we should note that some of what is being 
said is conjecture, since we have no way of knowing what is going on in the 
mind of the unconscious person. If we could indeed establish that there is 
pain, and that there is, in fact, considerable pain, then our answers might be 
quite different. That question, however, remains to be answered, although 
present consensus argues against the existence of such pain, mental or 
physical.3° 
Questions Related to Family and Caregivers 
What motives will enter into "substitutedjudgments" given by others on 
behalf of the patient? There is no doubt that a family undergoes 
considerable pain as it watches a loved one who remains for months or 
years in the persistent vegetative state. It is not at all unusual that members 
of that family find themselves , at times, wondering if death would not be a 
better alternative for the one who is afflicted. This feeling can and does arise 
out of love, compassion and concern for the sick person. It is also, almost 
always, influenced as well by the internal struggle experienced by those who 
are well. They experience the pain of loss as the person they love is now 
removed from conscious communication with them. They experience their 
own exhaustion if they are very directly involved in the care for the patient. 
All of these are emotions that one would expect to find in such a situation. 
The family members, however, must be careful not to allow their own fears 
or frustrations to become the basis for the moral decision making that now 
falls to them. They must exercise for the one who is ill the same stewardship 
of life that is the obligation of each of us in our own regard. The desire to 
escape from our own burdens cannot become the source of a decision which 
would end the life of someone else. 
There are, of course, other far less worthy motives which can inspire 
people to decide to terminate nutrition for the unconscious patient. Anger, 
spite, greed, culpable lack of concern and a host of other motivations can 
also be part of our human decisions . For this reason it is also desirable that 
the benefit of the doubt be given to the continued sustenance of the life of 
the unconscious person. 
We must, however, take into real account situations in which the family 
has reached the moral limits of its abilities or its resources. In such a 
situation, they have done all that they can do and they are not morally 
obliged to do more. They would then have reached the limits of ordinary 
means. However, in the society in which we live this does not present a fully 
convincing argument. Resources are available from other sources and these 
can often be tapped before a family reaches dire financial straits. Such 
assistance has been and continues to be available. 
Euthanasia or Allowing to Die 
It would be unwise to complete our consideration of these questions 
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without addressing the question of euthanasia. The word once referred to 
the effort to help make one's dying process easier. It has come finally to refer 
to some sort of intervention which actually brings about death. 
Etymologically speaking, in ancient times euthanasia meant an easy death 
without severe suffering. Today one no longer thinks of this original meaning of 
the word, but rather of some intervention of medicine whereby the sufferings of 
sickness or of the final agony are reduced, sometimes also with the danger of 
suppressing life prematurely. Ultimately, the word euthanasia is used in a more 
particular sense to mean "mercy killing," for the purpose of putting an end to 
extreme suffering, or saving abnormal babies, the mentally ill or the incurably sick 
from the prolongation, perhaps for many years, of a miserable life, which could 
impose too heavy a burden on their families or on society. 
It is necessary to state clearly in what sense the word is used in the present 
document. 
By euthanasia is understood an action or an omission which of itself or by 
intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated. 
Euthanasia's terms of reference, therefore, are to be found in the intention of the 
will and in the methods used.3l 
Alleviation of suffering through the purposeful destruction of the life of 
the sufferer is clearly contrary to true Christian respect for life and Christian 
love of neighbor. Yet, in our own time, this solution is proposed more and 
more frequently and even by doctors, whose very profession should be 
geared to the preservation oflife.32 It has been said that in the Netherlands as 
many as one-sixth of all deaths are attributable to euthanasia.33 
The movement toward murder as a solution to problems has already 
begun in the societal attitude toward the killing of the unborn. It is rapidly 
entering into the realm of the "hopelessly" ill. It can just as easily be 
extended to include the seriously handicapped, either physically or 
mentally. In none of these cases is it a question of the good of the patient, 
but more a question ofthe exercise of a questionable autonomy founded in 
equally questionable "rights" of the individual. Decisions such as this are all 
too easily based on the desires or fears or even inconvenience of others and 
the patient's wishes may not even enter into the question. That is certainly the 
case with abortion, and canjust as easily become the case with the incurably 
ill. In both cases the decision is based on an attitude that there is such a thing 
as a human life not worthy to be lived. Those who are defective in some way 
are destroyed rather than cared for. It is an attitude which easily 
dehumanizes not only the victim' but the perpetrator as well. 34 
In 1986 the Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American 
Medical Association stated that "it is not unethical to discontinue all means 
of life-prolonging medical treatment" for patients in irreversible comas. 
This statement has the weight of whatever prestige that Council holds, even 
though it was not the decision ofa referendum of the members and does not 
tell us anything about how many of the members would support it. Nor 
should one be misled into thinking that the statement is based on the fact 
that such patients are suffering some sort of severe pain caused by the care 
that is being given them. This has already been discussed above, with the 
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conclusion that there is usually no excessive pain due to such feeding. In 
fact, that same Council in 1990 said: 
One aspect of the debate about stopping treatment in PVS focuses on a concern 
that the afflicted person will experience suffering after treatment is stopped (e.g., 
will experience dyspnea after removal of a respirator or face discomfort 
associated with starvation and dehydration after removal of a feeding tube.) The 
most obvious contradiction to this projection is that, by definition, in PVS both 
the person's capacity to perceive a wide range of stimuli and the neocortical or 
higher brain functions, that are needed to generate a self-perceived affective 
response to any such stimuli are destroyed. Pain cannot be experienced by brains 
that no longer retain the neural apparatus for suffering.3' 
But if the pain of the inability to breathe or the pain of starvation and 
dehydration cannot be felt, then there is no reason at all to support the 
contention that the removal of nutrition and hydration is being done out of 
concern for the sufferings of the patient. It must, therefore, be based upon 
something else; and what is that something else if not the decision that the 
life of this particular patient is not worth living? Sad to say, the intent is not 
to relieve suffering but, rather, to cause the patient to die. Nor can it be 
argued that it is merely the intention to "allow" the patient to die, rather 
than to "cause his death." The patient in the persistent vegetative state is 
not thereby in a terminal condition, since nutrition and hydration and 
ordinary care will allow him to live for years. It is only if that care is taken 
away - and barring any other new disease or debilitation - that the 
patient will die. It is the removal of the nutrition and hydration that brings 
about the death. This is euthanasia by omission rather than by positive 
lethal action, but it is just as really euthanasia in its intent. 
There is a vast difference between allowing a terminal patient to die and 
doing something to hasten the death. We find no moral problem in those 
situations in which treatments are withdrawn because they have become 
an excessive burden rather than a benefit to the terminal patient. We find 
no moral problem in the withdrawing even of nutrition and hydration 
from the patient if the supplying of them is futile or excessively 
burdensome36 . It is morally wrong, however, to take these extreme cases 
and make them the norm for all cases of persistent vegetative state 
patients, when treatment or care will allow that patient to continue to live 
and will do so without a burden of excessive pain or suffering. In such cases 
their removal is tantamount to passive euthanasia (killing by omission). 
Much of the contemporary discussion seems to have lost sight entirely of 
the difference between allowing to die when no treatment or care can any 
longer save the patient and murder by omission. Recalling the moral truth 
that one is not obliged to employ means that are either futile or too 
burdensome, but must never intentiomilly act against innocent human life, 
we see a clear moral distinction between intending and allowing. The latter 
is permissible in some circumstances - those involving extraordinary 
means - the former is always immoral and therefore forbidden. 
22 Linacre Quarterly 
Conclusion 
As a general conclusion, in almost every instance there is an obligation to 
continue supplying nutrition and hydration to the unconscious patient. 
There are situations in which this is not the case, but those are the 
exceptions and should not be made into the rule. We can and do offer our 
sympathy and support to those who must make such hard decisions in those 
difficult cases. We cannot and do not offer our support to those who are 
willing to remove from patients the means of sustaining nourishment on the 
ground that their lives are not worthy of our continued care and concern. 
Respect for personal autonomy is a basic principle of medical ethics. This 
principle reinforces the duty of hospital personnel to secure the consent of 
patients or their surrogates before initiating or discontinuing treatment. It 
does not reduce them to mere functionaries who can do no more than carry 
out the orders of the patient or the patient's surrogate. The purpose of 
medicine is no more the mere satisfaction of patients' or surrogates' desires 
than the purpose of teaching is to give students only what they explicitly 
desire to learn. As a student of medicine the physician has a knowledge of 
health and the effects of disease. As a professional the physician is dedicated 
to keeping patients healthy or, at least, to relieving their suffering. When 
there are alternative treatments or courses of action, the physician will lay 
out the advantages and disadvantages of the various choices, and show 
respect for the autonomy of patients not by merely acceding to their wishes 
but by telling them the truth and enabling them to make the right decisions. 
Neither the patient nor the surrogates of the patient have the moral right to 
withhold or withdraw treatment that is ordinary. Neither does the physician 
have the right to do so simply because the patient or the surrogates ask or 
demand this. In this perspective the physician responds to patient desires 
only if those desires accord with the proper professional and moral 
judgment as to what will promote the health, preserve the life or prevent the 
suffering of the patient. The physician's duty has not been properly done if 
there has been no effort to persuade the patient to follow the proper course 
of action. If the patient decides to refuse excessively burdensome or futile 
treatment, the physician may properly comply with the request. If the 
patient decides to refuse ordinary treatment, there may, in some instances, 
be little that the physician can do to prevent this, but there remains at least 
the duty to attempt to persuade the patient otherwise or, failing that, for the 
physician to remove himself from the case so as not to be guilty of 
complicity in suicide. 
It is important to recall that historically the practitioners and researchers 
in medical science have steadfastly and, in some cases, heroically striven to 
offer the very best of care to their patients. If some solution to a medical 
problem were not available, they gave their time, energies and sometimes 
even their lives and fortunes to find it, to invent it, to discover some way to 
preserve their patients' lives and alleviate their suffering. It is our hope that 
medical science will remain faithful to this wonderful heritage which has 
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been of inestimable advantage to humanity. Using the talents that God has 
given them, those who have dedicated their lives to providing health care to 
their fellow human beings need to know that their work is respected and 
valued by all of us. The fact that there remains so much to do, even though 
so much has already been achieved, should not discourage them nor deter 
them from the search for further solutions to problems that we still face. 
New procedures may have to be found to resolve difficulties of suffering and 
discomfort. Cost effective and affordable treatments and care need to be 
developed so that the burden of caring . for the ill will not impoverish 
families nor add unreasonably to their burdens. Diagnostic methods should 
be studied so that we can begin to ascertain with better certainty the pain 
that may actually be suffered by the unconscious. The tradition of health 
science shows that physicians and nurses have not avoided solving 
problems which human sickness and disease have presented in the past. We 
are confident that that same tradition will inspire present and future health 
care providers to do the same. 
We ask also that those in the judicial and legislative fields bring their 
expertise to bear on these cases and that they will do so with full attention 
not only to the la w alone but to the basic norms of morality and full respect 
for human life which ought to supply the proper basis for good law. Because 
of new circumstances generated by medical and scientific advances, there 
has been serious interest in advance medical directives such as the living will 
and durable power of attorney. It is quite reasonable to want to leave 
instructions regarding one's own health care in the event of incapacitation. 
It is not necessary to submit to procedures which are truly extraordinary or 
futile. But we caution all those involved in legislation and judgment that 
laws must have their true foundation in those same principles which guide 
our moral decisions . Recent court opinions have come very close to 
agreeing that simply because the patient wishes, nutrition and hydration 
can be discontinued, even when there is not a question of something that is 
overly burdensom or simply futile to the patient. The law and legal 
decisions should never be such as to encourage the removal of the essential 
means of life and thus yield to a clear intent to bring about death and not 
merely to the willingness to yield to the fact of human life that all must die 
and that the day will come for each of us when this is inevitable. The laws 
must be just and must be based on unequivocal principles which identify the 
taking of innocent human life and make it illegal, with full recognition that 
it is already immoral. We should be most cautious and develop these 
principles very carefully since many of the arguments we have heard in 
favor of the removal of nutrition and hydration from one group of patients, 
those in the PVS for example, could easily be applied in the cases of other 
groups, such as the retarded, the elderly, the incurably crippled, and any 
other whose diseases modern medicine has not yet been able to cure. · 
Naturally, it would be irresponsible to stand by idly and let such a tragedy 
occur. 
Finally, we appeal to those whose loved ones are in this sad state of 
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unconsciousness. We ask them to allow their pain to give life to an even 
greater desire to serve those whom they love. We offer our support, our 
consolation and our sympathy and we offer also our prayers and our 
spiritual support. We ask them to trust in the mercy and goodness of God in 
this situation just as they must do in every situation in life . We join with 
them in accepting the joy and the burden of stewardship for God's gift of 
life. We pray that they and we alike may hold lovingly to the gift of life itself, 
so that when the time comes for us to leave this world and enter into the 
fullest love of God, we may bring with us that deepest love of life which 
begins here and finds its fulfillment there. 
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25. Cf. Merck Manual, pp. 904-907. 
26. A standard method would be to introduce a catheter though the wall of the chest and 
into the vena cava. This is a much more serious process than we usually tend to imagine when 
we think of intravenous injection. This is, in fact, a surgical procedure and the proper 
placement of the catheter is verified by X-ray. Cf. Merck Manual, pp. 907-911. 
27. One example of this distinction can be found in The Report of Pontifical 
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Academy of Sciences on the Artificial Prolongation of Life. 1985. The text of this report may 
be found in Origins. December 5. 1985. and in Conserving Human Life. The Pope John 
Center, Braintree, MA, pp. 305-307. The document reads, in part: "By the term treatment 
the group understands all those medical interventions available and appropriate in a specific 
case, whatever the complexity of the techniques involved. If the patient is in a permanent, 
irreversible coma, as far as can be foreseen, treatment is not required, but all care should be 
lavished on him, including feeding. If it is clinically established that there is a possibility of 
recovery, treatment is required. If treatment is of no benefit to the patient, it may be 
interrupted while continuing with the care of the patient. By the term, "care," the group 
understands ordinary help due to sick patients, such as compassion and spiritual and 
affective support due to every human being in danger." Cf. also Jura et Bona. I V 
(Dec/aration on Euthanasia). 
28. The statement of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences is quoted in the preceding note. 
The statement of the Pontifical Council has this to say: "On the contrary, there remains the 
strict obligation to continue by all means those measures which are called 'minimal,' which 
are intended normally and customarily for the maintenance of life (alimentation [feeding], 
blood transfusions, injections, etc.). To interrupt these minimal measures would be 
equivalent, in practice, to wishing to put an end to the life of the patient." (Quoted by Orville 
N. Griese in Conserving Human Life. p. 172.) 
29. What is said here about pain can be verified by reading such sources as: Michael P. 
McQuillen, M.D., "Can People Who Are Unconscious or in the 'Vegetative State' Perceive 
PainT in Issues in Law and Medicine. Spring 1991, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 373-383; "Position of 
the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of 
the Persistent Vegetative State Patient," in Neurology. 125 (1989), quoted by Kevin 
O'Rourke, O.P., in "Should Nutrition and Hydration Be Provided to Permanently 
Unconscious and Other Mentally Disabled Persons?" in Issues in Law and Medicine. Fall 
1989, Vol. 5, No.2.; Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs, "Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life 
Support," in JAMA. 263, January 19, 1990, pp. 426-429. 
30. Since there is no way in which we can enter into the mind of the patient who is 
unconscious, we cannot offer definitive statements about pain. Some authors would seem to 
indicate that there may be pain. For example, we read "Pain is a complex phenomenon, 
neither necessary nor sufficient to explain suffering. An analysis of the neuroscience of pain 
leads to the conclusion that pathways sufficient for the perception and modulation of pain 
need not rise nor descend to levels generally thought necessary for consciousness. Pain may 
be expressed not only in language, but also in autonomic and motor behavior that can be 
shown to correlate in a linear fashion with subjective pain sensation. Patients rendered 
unconscious by anesthesia, or who recover from traumatic coma, manifest memories of their 
time without consciousness. Although by definition the unconscious patient cannot tell you 
that he perceives pain, available data suggest that he may; therefore, you cannot know that 
he doesn't." (McQuillen, op cit .. p. 383.) Others, however. would hold that such pain is 
impossible (cf. Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
"Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support," in 
JAMA. 263, January 19, 1990.) 
31. Sacred Congregaiion for the Doctrine of the Faith, Jura et Bona. fl (Dec/aration on 
Euthanasia). 5 May, 1980, translation from Austin Flannery, O.P., Vatican Council fl. 
More Post Conciliar Documents. The Liturgical Press, Collegeville, MN (© 1982 by Harry J . 
Costello and Reverend Austin Flannery, O.P.), p. 512. 
32. In the medical literature itself there is clear and growing evidence that even doctors are 
beginning to look at the killing of patients as an alternative to treating or caring for them. In 
one editorial piece in JAMA (259, January 8, 1988, p. 272, "It's Over, Debbie"), a doctor 
describes his own intentional killing of a suffering patient, who did not ask him to do this. In 
a special article in The New England Journal of Medicine (320, no. 13, pp. 844-849, "The 
Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly III Patients") ten of a group oftwelve authors 
(all medical doctors) concluded that "it is not immoral for a physician to assist in the 
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rational suicide of a terminally ill person." 
33. Quoted by C. Everett Koop, M. D., Sc. D., "Decisions at the End of Life," in Issues in 
Law and Medicine, Fall 1989, Vol. 5, No.2, p. 226. 
34. Koop (op. cit. , p. 227) quotes from Doctor Leo Alexander writing in the New England 
Journal of Medicine in 1948 in reference to the euthanasia program in Nazi Germany. Once 
any life was deemed worthy of not living, then it merely became a question of an authority 
which would determine just how many groups of people would eventually fit into that 
category. Alexander wrote: "This attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the 
severely and chronically sick. Gradually the sphere of those to be included in this category 
was enlarged to encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, and 
finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely small wedged-in lever 
from which this entire trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward the 
nonrehabilitable sick." 
35. Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, "Persistent 
Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support," in JA MA, 263, 
January 19, 1990, p. 428. 
36. The supply of nutrition and hydration can rightly be judged an extraordinary means 
because offutility, for example, when death is imminent (provided it no longer serves even as 
a palliative); and in cases where the patient is unable to assimilate what is being supplied. 
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